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Abstract 
 
The increasing adoption of international accounting standards and global convergence of 
accounting regulations is frequently heralded as serving to reduce diversity in financial 
reporting practice.  In a process said to be driven in large part by the interests of 
international business and global financial markets, one might expect the greatest degree 
of convergence to be found amongst the world’s largest multinational financial 
corporations.  
 
This paper challenges such claims and presumptions.  Its content analysis of longitudinal 
data for the period 2000-2006 reveals substantial, on going diversity in the market risk 
disclosure practices, both numerical and narrative, of the world’s top-25 banks. The 
significance of such findings is reinforced by the sheer scale of the banking sector’s risk 
exposures that have been subsequently revealed in the current global financial crisis.  The 
variations in disclosure practices documented in the paper apply both across and within 
national boundaries, leading to a firm conclusion that, at least in terms of market risk 
reporting, progress towards international harmonisation remains rather more apparent 
than real.  
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Market Risk Reporting by the World’s Top Banks: Evidence on the 
Diversity of Reporting Practice and the Implications for International 
Accounting Harmonisation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“The rationale for a global standard, rather than the Babel of competing and 
sometimes contradictory national standards, has been often stated. But it is so 
important that it bears repeating. Global accounting standards would improve 
investor confidence in the market, so long as the standards are high-quality, 
comprehensive and rigorously applied. They'd allow investors to draw better 
comparisons among investment options. They'd also lower costs for issuers, who 
would no longer have to incur the cost of preparing financial statements using 
different sets of accounting standards. And those lower costs would benefit the 
company's shareholders, who ultimately bear the burden of the entire cost of the 
financial reporting system.” 
 
(Chairman's Address to the SEC Roundtable on International Financial Reporting 
Standards by Chairman Christopher Cox, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Washington, D.C. March 6, 2007) 
 
 “The ‘best and the brightest’ at our top investment banks have expended great 
energy designing ludicrously complex financial products, which you need a Nobel 
Prize in physics to understand. Whilst financial innovation and securitisation have 
brought real benefits and allowed for risk dispersion through the system, it has 
come at a cost.  Product complexity has introduced increased opacity into our 
financial system, making it almost impossible to determine where risk lies and 
making it much more difficult to achieve financial stability.” 
(John McFall MP, Chairman of the House of Commons Treasury Committee, 
commenting on the Committee’s report, Financial Stability and Transparency, 6th 
report of Session 2007/08, see 
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/treasury_committee/tc0708p
n30.cfm) 
 
Historic differences in accounting practice around the world have been well documented 
and analysed by accounting researchers. There is extensive literature on both the 
classification of accounting systems (e.g., Gray, 1988; Doupnik and Salter, 1993; Nobes 
1998) and the analysis of variations in accounting principles and disclosure practices 
(e.g., Walton, 1992; Meek et al., 1995; Choi and Levich, 1996; Gray et al., 1995). 
However, in the light of regulatory initiatives encouraging international harmonisation of 
accounting and a convergence of thinking between national regulatory bodies, there are 
evident grounds for claiming that such diversities of practice are disappearing.   
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In May 2000, the acceptance by IOSCO of the IASC’s1 core set of standards as a basis 
for cross border listings opened the door to global harmonisation. That same year, the 
European Commission imposed a requirement that from January 2005 exchange-listed 
companies in all member countries should prepare consolidated accounts according to 
Commission-endorsed IFRSs. To date, over one hundred countries have either already 
adopted IFRS, aligned their national standards to IFRS, or have committed themselves to 
doing so in the foreseeable future.  Frits Bolkestein, commissioner in charge of the 
European Commission’s Internal Market, described the European agreement as a move 
that signalled “a new era of transparency and the end of a Tower of Babel in financial 
reporting in Europe” (Blanchet, 2002).  Such European developments still left 
fundamental differences between the accounting practices within IFRS and US GAAP.  
These differences meant that all non-US firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange or 
NASDAQ were required to file returns with the  SEC and provide both income and 
equity reconciliations to US GAAP.  This essentially meant that the global financial 
reporting environment could effectively be divided into four main groupings, 
incorporating companies reporting under either: IFRS; IFRS with an accompanying 
reconciliation to US GAAP; US GAAP; or applying national accounting rules that 
differed from both IFRS and US GAAP. 
 
Subsequent efforts to eradicate international differences have included a growing number 
of countries committing, albeit in varying degrees, to the IFRS roadmap (notably, 
including countries such as China and South Korea).  Developments to reduce the 
difference between IFRS and US GAAP have included: the joint IASB/FASB 
Memorandum of Understanding arising out of the Norwalk Agreement (2002) and, more 
recently, the November 2007 decision by the SEC to eliminate the above mentioned US 
GAAP reconciliation requirement for foreign private issuers of financial statements 
prepared in accordance with IFRS as issued by the IASB (with one, time-limited 
exception for issuers using the European Commission’s IAS 39 ‘carve out’).  Finally, the 
publication of a SEC Concepts Release on whether to allow US issuers to prepare their 
financial statements using IFRS (as published in English by the IASB) rather than US 
GAAP has made the strongest signals to date that the former is destined to become the 
world standard in global corporate financial reporting.   In a speech (1 February, 2008)  to 
the European-American Business Council, Christopher Cox, the Chairman of the SEC, 
emphasized that such developments reflected “the great progress that the International 
Accounting Standards Board has made in developing IFRS as a single, high-quality 
accounting standard that is implemented consistently in multiple jurisdictions around the 
world.  This year, the Commission will consider how we will map the future for U.S. 
firms and International Financial Reporting Standards. But one thing is certain: the 
expanded use of a single, high-quality accounting standard will eventually empower 
investors to make better informed investment decisions by giving them information that 
is more easily comparable” (see http://www.iasplus.com/usa/sec/0802coxifrs.pdf).  
                                                 
1 The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was the predecessor of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  For a detailed history of the IASC, see Camfferman and Zeff, 2007). 
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While the pace of regulatory action is certainly quickening with respect to the pursuit of 
accounting convergence, research studies, however, continue to show that a truly 
harmonized framework for useful financial reporting currently remains more of an 
objective than a current reality (for reviews, see Callao et al., 2007; Ball, 2006).  In a 
recent survey of senior UK finance executives on the impact of the introduction of IFRS 
in Europe, the conclusion was reached that “there remains significant doubt about the 
benefits to individual companies and the information available to the capital markets” 
(PwC, 2007, p.2). Two thirds of PwC survey respondents indicated that they did not 
believe that the introduction of IFRS had resulted in better information in the 
marketplace.  In contrast, an ICAEW (2007) on-line survey of EU investors, preparers 
and auditors found that 63% of investor respondents thought that IFRS had improved the 
quality of consolidated financial statements against 24% who thought that IFRS had 
made it worse (p. 25).2  However, 49% of investors thought that the switch to IFRS 
accounting had made financial statements more difficult to understand, although 32% 
disagreed – while a number of participants at a series of roundtable events felt that it was 
too early to judge whether the migration to IFRS had been a success (ICAEW, 2007, p. 
26).3 
 
What all of this standard setting and regulatory development means for the user of 
financial statements is a significant and ongoing research agenda. Not withstanding the 
current regulatory commitments to convergence, are financial reports becoming more 
comparable across international boundaries?  How easy is it for analysts to compare the 
information provided across different financial reporting regimes? For instance, do 
companies reporting under US GAAP provide more or different types of information to 
those reporting under IFRS?  The role of financial reporting in serving user needs and 
aiding decision usefulness is embedded in the conceptual frameworks of all the major 
accounting regulators, and often used to justify the inclusion of specific regulatory 
requirements.  However, as Young (2006) has argued, the user generally referred to by 
standard setters is a conceptual construction and the standard setting process tends not to 
encompass significant direct user involvement, nor reflect the interests of a wide 
stakeholder base of potential users. Such work presents significant legitimacy challenges 
to the work of international standard setting bodies, some of which have been very visible 
in recent years with concerns expressed over the pursuit of fair value accounting and 
revised standards on segmental reporting. . Indeed, the uncertainties associated with the 
pursuit of a new global accounting language are well illustrated by the recent joint 
statement by the largest international accounting firms, through the Global Public Policy 
Committee (GPPC), providing interpretations as to how auditors should treat certain 
                                                 
2 The corresponding figures for preparers were 60% and 14% respectively (80% and 8% for auditors).  A 
number of participants at a subsequent roundtable event felt that it was too early to judge whether the 
migration to IFRS had been a success (ICAEW, 2007, p. 26). 
3 It is worth pointing out that it was certain specific accounting policies (such as those for financial 
instruments) which caused most confusion (ICAEW, 2007, p. 25). 
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stipulations of IFRS in the context of today’s challenging economic and financial 
environment (see GPPC, 2007)4.     
 
This paper makes a timely contribution to heightened interests in, and concerns over, the 
quality of global financial reporting by examining the market risk disclosures of 
multinational banks over the period 2000-2006 and assessing the extent to which the de 
jure moves towards harmonization and convergence over this period have been 
accompanied by an equivalent de facto harmonization in financial reporting practice.  
Market risk disclosures by the world’s largest banks were chosen as the focus for this 
study for several reasons.  First, despite claims that banks have been at the forefront of 
developments in risk management, the banking sector is under-researched in terms of risk 
disclosures in corporate annual reports (for a review of the existing literature and some 
exploratory empirical work, see Linsley et al., 2006)5. Secondly, the complexities of the 
financial accounting practices of banks appear mainly to have stimulated surveys of the 
extent to which their annual reports collectively comply with the requirements of 
(international) accounting standards (see ICAEW, 2007, pp. 141-146; E&Y, 2006; PwC, 
2006) or studies focused on singular market risk disclosure items (such as Value at Risk 
(VaR) measures – see Perignon and Smith, 2007; Perignon et al., 2008).  Limitations of 
the former are that they represent broad-based surveys that struggle to go much beyond 
the listing of differences between standard and actual reporting practice6.  The latter type 
of studies, in contrast, can be restrictively specific. For instance, even though Perignon 
and Smith found that VaR disclosures varied widely across a sample of US commercial 
banks over the period 1996-2005, VaR information only represents just one element of a 
much wider set of market risk disclosures made by banks in their annual reports.   
                                                 
4 Similar minded guidance on auditing issues in difficult financial market conditions has also been provided 
by the UK’s Auditing Practices Board (see APB, 2008) and by the US based Centre for Audit Quality (see 
CAQ, 2007). 
5 Much of the work on risk disclosures in the 1990s centred on debates and discussions regarding desired, 
rather than actual, forms of disclosure – particularly, regarding the capacity to incorporate risk disclosures 
within a specific section or separate part of a company’s annual report and the extent to which risk 
information should be forward looking rather than based solely on historical information (see Linsley et al, 
2006, pp. 269-270; ICAEW, 1998; 1999; 2002; Schrand and Elliott, 1998; BCBS, 1998).  There has also 
been a tendency for the focus to be on the risk disclosure practices of non-financial companies rather than 
banks per se – see Abraham and Cox, 2007; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Dobler, 2008; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006).       
6 This compliance orientation can engender a rather conservative form of analysis which either lists 
differences in practices without considering their overall significance or somewhat underplays their 
potential significance.  An interesting case in point is Ernst and Young’s (2006) survey which found wide 
differences in market risk disclosures but concluded in the executive summary of the report that “(a)nother 
example of the challenge for consistency is the reporting of market risk sensitivities, where the use of 
different methods and criteria - no doubt appropriate to the banks concerned - leave the reader with a range 
of sensitivities that are difficult to compare (p. 7, emphasis added).  The strength of such ‘no doubt 
appropriate’ conclusions and assumptions can be weakened significantly by subsequent events – for 
instance, the E&Y (2006) report chose to highlight the ‘helpful’ nature of the disclosures in the 2005 
annual report of Société Genéralé on the limitations of VaR (p. 57)! 
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This paper seeks to draw on the strengths (and avoid the weaknesses) of both types of 
studies by addressing the broad range of market risk7 disclosures (rather than just one 
measure of risk) and considering this reporting from an international, comparative 
perspective (rather than a one country perspective) 
 
In studying patterns and variations in market risk reporting practices across the world’s 
leading banks, it is important to emphasise that such organizations are involved in a wide 
range of activities that extend beyond the traditional commercial banking activities of 
deposit and loan provision. While such (additional) activities vary somewhat across 
institutions, they can broadly be divided into securities trading and the provision of other 
retail and corporate services. The diversity of income sources is reflected in the banks’ 
financial statements and it is noticeable that, for many banks, a growing proportion of 
total income is earned through trading activities which potentially give rise to substantial 
market risk, in addition to that already related to traditional bank lending activities. The 
need for more research in the area of market risk reporting by banks has also been vividly 
highlighted by the current ‘credit crunch’.  Collective bank exposures to market risk is 
quite breath-taking. In October 2008 the Bank of England estimated that global mark-to- 
market losses across US dollar, Sterling and Euro currency areas amounted to around 
US$2.8 trillion or £1.8 trillion (Bank of England, 2008).  The financial crisis has certainly 
served to emphasize the extent of global economic interdependence resulting from the 
activities of financial institutions and the desire of banking supervisors, creditors, 
customers and investors to have access to information that facilitates an understanding of 
the risks being faced by financial institutions8.   
 
With market risk disclosures being required under both US GAAP and IFRS but with the 
prescribed content of disclosures differing between jurisdictions, it presents an obvious 
opportunity to investigate and compare the impact of discretion upon the information 
available to users across regulatory regimes.  Additionally, it is possible to study the 
potential impact of discretionary interpretation of IFRS upon the comparability of reports 
within IFRS ‘compliant’ jurisdictions.  There has been, and continues to be, much debate 
over the extent to which IFRS represents one global standard or, given the scope for 
discretion over levels of disclosure, a global standard with multiple national variants 
                                                 
7 Market risk is commonly defined as the exposure to an adverse change in the market value of portfolios 
and financial instruments caused by changes in market prices or rates. Such risk typically arises through the 
buying and selling of financial instruments that are sensitive to market risk. 
8 It is worth noting that the inclusion of specific disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 of the revised capital 
adequacy framework (Basel Committee, 2004), commonly referred to as Basel II and set to take effect from 
2008, illustrate the ‘pre-credit crunch’ recognition by a global regulator of the importance of ensuring that 
the market is kept informed about a bank’s exposure to risk.  Similarly, transcripts of the evidence 
presented to the House of Commons Treasury Committee by the Chief Executive and other staff from the 
Financial Services Authority (the UK banking regulator) show the core role played by the regulator in risk 
monitoring (see http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/536/536ev.pdf).  
Some empirical studies of bank reporting disclosures have concluded that disclosures related to risk 
management practices seem to be most influential in explaining cross-sectional variation in the cost of 
equity capital (see Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005, p. 441). 
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(especially given the absence of detailed implementation guidance - e.g., see Schipper, 
2005). Our research offers some insights into the extent to which detailed reporting 
practice might vary even under the same set of regulations, and even within the same 
country. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. In the next section we review the 
regulatory context within which the research is conducted. This is followed by a section 
that details the research methodology, including the data, research instrument deployed 
and methods used in analyzing the results. Section four reports the main results of the 
paper, while the final section concludes the analysis and assesses the main implications of 
the research undertaken.  .  
 
 
2. Regulatory Context 
 
The regulatory framework for financial and non financial reporting by banks is complex 
because regulations are formulated by a range of different bodies, including the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) or Basel Committee, the International Accounting 
Standards Board, national banking supervisors and local accounting standards boards. 
The regulations define the content/style of both reporting to the national supervisory 
bodies (such as the FSA in the UK) as well as the broader mix of capital market 
participants. Institutions that operate at a global level have to comply with multiple 
jurisdictional requirements.  
 
At a global level, the basic reporting rules are laid down by the Basel Committee, whose 
1998 publication, “Enhancing Bank Transparency”, was aimed at encouraging banks 
across the world to disclose ‘timely’ and ‘reliable’ information on a range of issues, 
including their risk management practice and risk exposure. Six years later, when the 
final framework for Pillar 3 of the revised capital adequacy accord (Basel II) was 
published, the Committee had converted this encouragement of disclosure into very 
specific reporting requirements that became effective from 2008 onwards. All banks 
seeking to comply with Basel II must report both qualitative and quantitative details in 
respect of their capital structure, capital adequacy, and different types of risk exposure 
including credit, market, operational, equities and interest rate risk (Basel Committee, 
2006).  The underlying argument for such disclosures is that “transparent risk information 
is potentially of great use to stakeholders” (Crockett, 2002, p.1). It is also useful to note 
that the Basel II disclosure requirements encompass both numerical and narrative 
elements, while certain academic research studies have highlighted the emphasis placed 
on narrative disclosures by both private investors (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997) and 
analysts (Breton and Taffler, 2001).   
 
The move towards the global regulation of risk disclosures by banks needs to be seen in 
the context of more than a decade of efforts by both national and international accounting 
and/or government regulators to improve reporting practice in this area. For example, in 
the USA the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s publication of Financial Accounting 
Standard (FAS) No. 119, “Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair 
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Value of Financial Instruments”, in 1994 was a direct response to calls for improved 
disclosure of information on institutional exposure to market risk sensitive financial 
instruments. FAS 119 was subject to criticism however because the disclosures continued 
to fail to provide users of the financial statements with the information required to 
identify a company’s net market risk exposures. As a result, the SEC took its first steps 
towards further improvements in disclosure practice (Linsmeier and Pearson, 1997) via 
the introduction of new qualitative and quantitative reporting requirements in Financial 
Reporting Release No. 48 (SEC, 1997).  Nonetheless, initial evidence on the impact of 
FRR 48, suggested that whilst market risk disclosures were improved, there remained 
scope for further improvement (Roulstone, 1999). At this point, US hopes were pinned 
upon FAS 133 (FASB, 1998) on accounting for derivatives and financial instruments, 
which came into delayed effect in June 2000. Between 2000 and 2006 there were no 
further refinements to the US risk reporting regulations. 
 
The IASC, published its first rules on qualitative and quantitative disclosures in relation 
to the risks associated with the use of financial instruments in International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 32 (IASC, 1995). The risks identified by IAS 32 included market, credit, 
liquidity and interest rate risks. IAS 32 was applicable to all types of businesses that used 
financial instruments but a complementary standard, IAS 30, established more detailed 
disclosure requirements for banks and financial institutions. The period 1995-2000 was a 
very active one for the IASC as they sought to generate a core set of standards in time for 
compliance with the 2000 deadline set by the agreement with IOSCO. IAS 30 was 
amended by IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement) with effect 
from January 2001. Subsequently, with effect from January 2005, the December 2003 
version of IAS 39 shifted the risk disclosure requirements across to IAS 32, but this 
change ran simultaneously with the IASB’s pursuit of a programme of updating the 
content of IAS 30. In 2004 the board published an exposure draft – ED 7 – on financial 
instruments disclosures which evolved into IFRS 7 in 2005. Interestingly, and in line with 
US regulations, IFRS 7 does not set separate rules for disclosures by banks or financial 
institutions; furthermore, its implementation, for accounting periods commencing after 1st 
January 2007, also saw the disappearance of disclosure requirements from IAS 32.  
 
The above review of regulatory activity in relation to risk reporting indicates that the 
period 2000-06, the focal point for this study, is one of international variation but also 
evolution. While the year 2000 marked a starting point for stability in US reporting 
requirements, within the broader international arena the IASB spent the years 2000-2006 
working simultaneously on changes to disclosure, recognition and measurement issues in 
respect of financial instruments. The net result is an environment in which there is 
considerable research scope in terms of considering international developments (and 
variations) in the market risk reporting practices of the world’s leading banks.   
 
In this paper, we address this developing reporting environment by focusing on three 
specific questions.  First, are market risk disclosure levels linked to bank size? Secondly, 
have such disclosures by banks increased over the period 2000-06? Lastly, within this 
context, has international diversity of risk reporting practice reduced over this time?  
Collectively, these questions enable consideration to be given to the status and impact of 
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market risk reporting initiatives and related accounting standards.  For instance, an 
assessment can be made of any linkage between sector leadership and levels of disclosure 
and whether banks with the largest market capitalisations disclose more.  Similarly, it is 
possible to consider whether disclosure levels are generally rising over time and the form 
of differences in reporting practices both within and across countries.  Or, in more 
technical terms, to assess whether the rate of de facto harmonisation is lagging behind the 
rate of de jure harmonization.     
 
Higher levels of market risk disclosure can be expected to be linked to the overall length 
of the annual report but this also raises questions about the potential for information 
overload on the part of the user/reader.  While many standard setting and regulatory 
initiatives both pre- and post-credit crunch have been premised on the pursuit of (and 
residing belief in) transparency, there are some clear indications that increasing levels of 
disclosure and explicit commitments to transparency in themselves are not necessarily 
sufficient.  As Jon Moulton, a leading private equity chief, recently emphasized (in giving 
evidence to the UK’s House of Commons Treasury Committee), there is much to 
question about the current state of bank annual financial reports:  
 
“All I am trying to do here is demonstrate to you the incredible complexity of 
what is going on here. You would not believe that this stuff is out there but it is 
out there, it is in the fine print and the mountains of paper that these industries 
produce. Here is what we have got, we have got an interconnected, mind-
blowingly complicated market where losses are not just limited to actual 
economic losses, there are economic losses arising because of the amplifying 
effects of the inter-connectedness, the loss of confidence and fear. It is very hard 
indeed to estimate what a $5 billion loss in sub-prime really means to the financial 
markets. It might be $50 billion of losses, the complexity has no limit. However, 
there is no doubt that both the regulators' and directors' skills in these entities are 
limited. You have interviewed people who did not know what a CDO was and 
you have interviewed people who do not understand how this lot fits together at 
all. I do not think you are ever going to get to a situation where boards of directors 
and regulators can handle this level of complexity in an effective way. 
Transparency does not do it. If you look at an HSBC set of accounts, famously 
400 and something pages last month and the Royal Mail would not carry it for 
health and safety reasons, they are unreadable. Northern Rock was a master of 
disclosure. Everything about Northern Rock is available on its website still. You 
can find all the details, their off-balance sheets, their guarantees, but how you are 
supposed to interpret a 400 page document on one of the guarantees, with 11 
layers of debt, interest rate swaps, currency swaps done in three currencies, I do 
not know. Transparency will not do it. Disclosure does not get you to the answer 
because nobody understands it or follows it.” 
(Jon Moulton, Managing Director, Alchemy Partners, giving oral evidence before 
the House of Commons Treasury Committee, 13th May, 2008; see 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/uc536-
ii/uc53602.htm) 
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While being very sensitive to the relationship between levels/forms of disclosure and the 
understandability of bank annual reports, the research task and results documented in this 
paper focus primarily on the extent of market risk disclosures and the nature and scale of 
differences across the banking sector.   Such empirical positioning was seen to be an 
important first step in moving debate beyond both the anecdotal and any polemical 
tendencies encouraged by today’s global financial crisis.  That said, the results obtained 
and the process by which the data used for the study was collected provide some 
pertinent insights and reflections on the general informativeness of market risk 
disclosures in the banking sector.   
 
3. Research Approach  
We began our empirical study with the lists of banks identified by The Banker as the 
“Top 25” in the world. The Banker produces a number of different lists of the “Top 25”, 
based upon a range of alternative ranking criteria, including total assets, Tier 1 capital, 
and market capitalization. The “Top 25” varies according to the ranking criteria selected 
so that, for example, only 19 of the “Top 25” defined in terms of  total assets also appear 
in the “Top 25” ranked by market capitalization.  This study utilizes the “Top 25” ranked 
by market capitalization as we believe that market capitalization is a more natural 
measure of bank size than any of the alternatives.9  
 
As might be expected, the banks appearing in the “Top 25” by market capitalization, and 
their individual rankings, both change over time. Comparing the “Top 25” at the start 
(2000), mid (2003) and end (2006) points of our study reveals a number of clear trends in 
the composition of the list. Firstly, the table is dominated by US and UK banks. 
Additionally, there is consistency in relation to the top three banks, namely Citigroup, 
HSBC and Bank of America. Individual rankings in the remainder of the table are, 
however, more volatile over time.  Table 1 summarises the geographic composition of the 
“Top 25” over the same time frame, revealing a number of changes in the geographic 
mix. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Most noticeably, between 2000 and 2003 a total of five Japanese banks are demoted from 
the list and replaced by banks from Australia, Canada, and mainland Europe. Between 
2003 and 2006 three US banks fall out of the table, and three Japanese banks reappear. 
2006 also marks the entry of a Chinese bank in the tables, following privatization of some 
of the country’s largest institutions. Explanation and discussion of the causes of these 
shifts in both the banks and their respective rankings in the tables is beyond the scope of 
                                                 
9 In earlier research on market risk disclosure practice by international commercial banks, Perignon and 
Smith (2007) use total assets as the criteria for size ranking. We consider this approach to be flawed 
because it uses the “raw” accounting figures, which are subject to potential bias as a result of variations in 
accounting practice across institutions and the differential effects of the use of fair versus historic values for 
particular asset classes. In addition, there is no intuitive reason why a bank that owns more assets will 
necessarily be motivated to disclose more information about market risk, particularly if those assets are not 
market related.  
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this paper, but it is worth noting that these changes may have implications for 
international comparison of financial reporting practice in the sector.  
 
Table 2 identifies the “Top 25” as at July 2003, mid-way through our period of study, and 
is used as the initial framework for analysis. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
In order to meet our requirement to analyse only those market risk disclosures relating to 
trading activities two US banks, Wells Fargo and Fifth Third Bancorp, were eliminated 
from our sample of twenty five: neither bank engages in any significant level of trading 
activity, so both are irrelevant to our study. Of the twenty three used in the analysis, 
eighteen are listed on the NYSE, one on NASDAQ, and the remainder on at least one 
other international stock exchange (e.g., such as Paris, Tokyo or London) as well as on 
their own domestic stock market. Thus, the sample banks are all major multinational 
entities characterized by multiple listings, and hence might be expected to display more 
homogenized and perhaps more advanced reporting practices than smaller institutions.  
 
In deciding where to look for market risk disclosures, we recognize that there are a range 
of tools and routes used by companies to disclose information to the markets. That said, 
academic researchers continue to identify the annual report as the primary 
communications device (Botosan, 1997; Knutson, 1992). On this basis, therefore, all of 
the data used in the following analysis is drawn from the sample companies’ annual 
reports.  The only exception to this procedure is the case of Union Bank of Switzerland, 
which is unique in disclosing almost all of the risk related information in a handbook 
which is published separately from the annual report. The handbook was therefore also 
utilized in the disclosure analysis for UBS.  
 
In order to understand how disclosures may be evolving over time, reports were analysed 
for each of the years 2000, 2003 and 2006. Leaving three year gaps allows greater scope 
for the identification of step changes in reporting practice.  In particular, it enables us to 
consider the impact of staged, but significant, developments in IFRS accounting 
regulations within the chosen topic area10 against a backdrop of unchanging US 
regulation.  
 
Documenting the Disclosure of Market Risks  
Content analysis was used as the framework to identify and analyse the disclosure 
practices of each bank.  Critical to such a research method is the definition of the unit of 
                                                 
10 In 2000 and 2003 the Europe-wide agreement on IFRS implementation had not come into effect, and so 
the majority, but not all, large banks reported in accordance with national GAAP. For those choosing to 
adopt IFRS, the disclosure rules relevant to this paper are found within IAS 30. For financial reports for the 
year 2000, the 1994 version of the standard was applicable. A revised version was applicable from 1st 
January 2001 but this remained irrelevant to those using national GAAP. The first broad application of the 
revised standard would have been in 2005 with European harmonisation. In order to retain equal blocks of 
time across our analysis period, we opted to look at 2006 annual reports rather than those from 2005. 
Interestingly, IAS 30 has now been replaced by IFRS7 with effect from 2007 – offering the scope for 
further study of the relative impact of changes in IFRS.   
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analysis.  Milne and Adler (1999) suggest that sentences are the most reliable unit, but 
this approach is only valid in cases where purely narrative text is being studied. Unerman 
(2000) described narrative analysis as being only partial content analysis because 
information may also be provided in the form of graphs, tables etc.  His view was re-
iterated by Beattie and Thompson (2007) who called for future studies to consider a range 
of communication methods that extend beyond pure narrative. 
 
The regulations on risk reporting prescribe minimal requirements in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms, and so risk disclosures commonly take the form of a mix of narrative, 
tabular, numerical and graphical data. Consequently, the use of sentences as the unit of 
analysis in this context would have been incomplete and we, therefore, defined the unit of 
analysis as being information provided in narrative, tabular, graphical or numerical 
format. An illustration of the different categories of disclosure is helpful and these are 
provided below from the 2003 annual report of Citigroup, which is ranked as the world’s 
largest bank.  
 
NARRATIVE 
Price risk in trading portfolios is measured through a complementary set of 
tools, including factor sensitivities, value-at-risk, and stress testing. Each 
trading portfolio has its own market risk limit framework, encompassing 
these measures and other controls, including permitted product lists and a 
new product approval process for complex products, established by the 
business and approved by independent market risk management. 
Factor sensitivities are defined as the change in the value of a position for a 
defined change in a market risk factor (e.g., the change in the value of a 
Treasury bill for a 1 basis point change in interest rates). It is the 
responsibility of independent market risk management to ensure that factor 
sensitivities are calculated, monitored and, in most cases, limited, for all 
relevant risks taken in a trading portfolio. 
 
Source: Citigroup Annual Report 2003, p. 83 
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TABULAR/NUMERICAL 
The following table summarizes Value-at-Risk in the trading portfolios as 
of December 31, 2003 and 2002, along with the averages: 
 
Source: Citigroup Annual Report 2003, p.84 
 
 
GRAPHICAL 
 
 
Source: Citigroup Annual Report 2003, p.83 
 
 
Having chosen to consider market risk disclosures of narrative, tabular/numerical and/or 
graphical forms, the next task was to decide on an appropriate classification system so as 
to gain an overall appreciation of the scale and patterns of disclosure.  We opted for the 
construction of a score sheet. This was done by manual extraction of information on 
market risk for trading activities drawn from the annual reports of all the sample banks 
for the years 2000, 2003 and 2006.  The score sheet was designed by reviewing the 
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categories of information on market risk disclosed by the sampled banks The identified 
information categories covered all aspects of market risk management including trading 
instruments, levels of trading activity, sizes of trading positions, scenario modeling, VaR 
analysis and validation procedures.   
 
In all, a total of 41 potential disclosures were identified, and these are listed in Table 3, 
which provides an illustrative example of a completed score sheet for HSBC (2003). 
HSBC had one of the highest levels of disclosures in all of the three years considered, 
obtaining a score of 36 (out of 41) in each of 2000 and 2003 and 34 in 2006. This level of 
score indicates a bank with a high and quite consistent level of disclosure. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
The ex-ante list of potential disclosures was then used to apply a binary coding system to 
the reports for each of the sample 23 banks for the years 2000, 2003 and 200611. A bank 
was given a score of 1 if the information was reported and a score of 0 if it was not. This 
simple weighting system is in line with the approach adopted by other researchers in the 
field (Robins and Austin, 1986; Wallace et al., 1994).  It was also felt to be consistent 
with our principal research aims in this paper – namely, to provide some much needed 
indication of trends and variations in the scale of market risk disclosures in the banking 
sector.  In this respect, its usage reflects Marston and Shrives’ (1991) observation that a 
disclosure score provides a measure of the extent, but not of the quality, of disclosures.   
   
The score sheet was completed by a coder reading the full contents of the annual reports. 
Scoring validity was then tested using coder reliability checks which involved the blind 
repetition of the coding process by another of the researchers. The full content of the 
banks’ annual reports was examined because an earlier study (Woods and Marginson, 
2004) has shown that risk disclosures are widely scattered across the annual report, with 
qualitative information commonly reported in the financial review, but supplemented by 
quantitative data in the relevant notes to the accounts. Additionally, important market risk 
related information, such as dealing revenue/profits/assets/liabilities are included in the 
core financial statements. The need to look at the full report in order to locate all relevant 
risk disclosures is very time consuming for the researcher, but also indicates the 
difficulties faced by any stakeholder who wishes to identify a bank’s overall risk 
exposure. As a random example of the level of effort required for such an analysis, the 
2006 annual report of the Dutch bank ABN Amro contained market risk disclosures on 
each of the following pages: 77, 78, 100, 152, 200, 211 and 212.  
 
Having calculated our disclosure scores for each bank, we focused on three different 
aspects of disclosure practice: 
• The relationship between disclosure and bank size. 
• Changes in disclosure practices over time. 
                                                 
11 For the sake of consistency, we analyse the disclosures for a common set of 23 banks based upon the 
2003 market capitalisation rankings. As a result the sample size reduces to 21 in 2006 because Bank One is 
absorbed into JPMorgan Chase in the intervening period, and similarly Fleet Boston is merged with Bank 
of America.  
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• Institutional and international variations in disclosure practice. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Disclosure and Size 
Table 2 shows that the sample institutions vary considerably in their size. The smallest of 
the twenty five banks, the Royal Bank of Canada, has a market capitalization (as at 2003) 
of just below US$30bn, whilst the largest, Citigroup, is worth in excess of $234bn. On 
this basis, it is appropriate to assess and evaluate the strength, if any, of any relationship 
between the bank size and disclosure scores. 
 
Roberts et al. (1998) observe that “there is general support for the proposition that 
disclosure levels increase as companies get larger.” This suggests that we might expect to 
see a positive relationship between disclosure scores and bank size. To examine this issue 
further, we estimated the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for disclosure scores and 
bank size rankings for each of the three years, and results are reported in Table 4.  None 
of the correlations were statistically significant at a conventional significance level of 
5%, leaving us to conclude that there is no significant or stable correlation between 
disclosure levels and institution size.12   
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
These findings are supported by a more casual examination of the relative rankings of 
each bank, as shown in Table 4 for year 2003. For example, the world’s largest bank, 
Citigroup, was ranked only fourteenth in terms of its disclosure practices in 2000 and 
eleventh in 2003. Only in 2006 does its disclosure score more closely correlate with its 
size. Conversely, ABN Amro, which is placed twenty-first in terms of size, was ranked 
much higher - fifth (2000), seventh (2003) and then sixteenth (2006) - by the level of its 
risk disclosures. Similarly, the Royal Bank of Canada ranks bottom by size, but ranks as 
high as tenth (2000), eighth (2003) and fourth (2006) for its disclosure practice. 
 
Changes in Disclosure Practice over Time 
We turn now to the issue of how levels of disclosure might be changing over time. We 
alluded already to the fact that the bulk of disclosures in market risk reporting are 
voluntary in nature, and in recent years there has been increasing support for voluntary 
rather than mandatory reporting in a number of areas of accounting. For example, an 
FASB (2001) report suggested that companies can achieve benefits in the capital markets 
from increased levels of voluntary disclosure, implying that voluntary disclosures might 
be in firms’ own interests. Schrand and Elliott (1998), however, argued that there is little 
                                                 
12 The lack of any statistically significant relationship between disclosure and bank size may be due to the 
fact that, even though there are large differences in the size of the institutions within the sample, the 
absolute size of even the smallest of the banks is still very large. The results obtained may indicate that 
there is a threshold level of market capitalisation that can usefully be used to define a “large” company, and 
that for banks above that level (such as those in our sample), there is no particular correlation between size 
and disclosure. Further research is required, however, to test the validity of this hypothesis. 
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empirical evidence of the link between the cost of capital and risk disclosures and 
consequently there is little incentive for voluntary disclosures. Furthermore, it can also be 
argued that where disclosure is voluntary, then managers may be tempted to delay or 
manipulate the reporting of bad news – although see Schleicher et al. (2007, p. 169-170) 
for a discussion of the difficulties in identifying cause-effect relationships in voluntary 
disclosures.  
 
Table 5 shows the disclosure scores for each bank over each of the three years of 
analysis. The mean disclosure score is 22.4 in 2000, 26.4 for 2003 and 27.9 for 2006. 
Thus, average disclosure levels show a mildly increasing trend over both the period 2000-
2003 and 2003-2006. The ratio of the mean to the standard deviation indicates that the 
improvement is more marked over the earlier years, but, possibly of more significance, is 
the fact that the mean disguises a number of very clear and dramatic shifts in disclosure 
practice amongst a number of individual banks. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
There are, for example, clear exceptions to the general rule of rising scores, as six banks 
reduce the extent of their disclosure levels between 2003 and 2006. The most notable 
reductions are those of SCH and BNP Paribas, at minus 26 and minus 23 points 
respectively, but UBS and ABN Amro also exhibit the same trend. Most interestingly, the 
one common feature across all four of these banks is that they switched from reporting 
under local GAAP to using IFRS during the relevant period.  
 
At one level this might be interpreted as an indication that IFRS reduces the market risk 
information available to shareholders but this is probably over-simplistic. An alternative 
and perhaps more credible explanation is that the banks have taken risk information out 
of their annual report and are now providing it elsewhere. We sought to investigate 
further what was happening by checking the position in relation to the most extreme case 
of BNP Paribas which, as Table 6 shows, scores zero for its market risk disclosures in 
2006. We checked the French statutory filings for BNP Paribas, together with all of the 
2006 reports posted on the bank’s website, but were still unable to find any market risk 
disclosures reported there. Even questions to a senior “Big Four” auditor in France failed 
to provide us with an explanation for the omission of even the most basic required 
disclosures. The reason for BNP Paribas’ “zero disclosure” therefore remains a mystery 
which also raises significant questions about the enforcement of IFRS rules. 
 
There is one other result in Table 5 which warrants individual comment, and that is the 
case of Société Genéralé, which achieved a ‘perfect’ score of 41 in 2006. This score is 
especially revealing in the light of the recent events at the bank, where the activities of a 
‘rogue trader’ generated direct losses of around €5 billion and left its reputation for risk 
management reportedly “in tatters” (Lex Column, FT, 2008). This result, in itself, 
emphasizes just how important it is for research to study further what is being provided in 
the name of market risk disclosures.  It certainly emphasizes the dangers of assuming that 
high levels of disclosure go hand-in-hand with the existence of effective risk management 
systems.    
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Table 5 also reports the standard deviations of disclosure levels in each year 
(respectively, 7.0, 6.7 and 10.7 for each of 2000, 2003 and 2006). These confirm that 
there is a fair amount of disparity in disclosure practices across different banks but that 
the degree of disparity is showing no clear tendency to diminish. We also see from Table 
5 that banks can be classified into the following groups: 
 
• Banks that have consistently high levels of disclosure (e.g., HSBC, Deutsche, 
ABN Amro). 
• Banks whose disclosure levels are consistently average (e.g., HBOS, Lloyds TSB, 
NAB) 
• Banks that have consistently low levels of disclosure (e.g., US BankCorp, 
BankOne). 
• Banks that have improved strongly in their disclosure levels (e.g., Wachovia, 
Unicredito, Royal Bank of Canada, Société Genéralé). 
 
In order to try and explain why a bank may fall into one or other of the above categories, 
we compared the disclosure scores against the regulatory regime governing their financial 
reporting and also the length of the annual report. Within any single regulatory context, a 
degree of consistency might be expected in the extent of disclosure across institutions – 
such that they tend to remain one specific disclosure category.  However, as shown 
below, our findings indicate that this is not the case. Additionally, the overall length of 
the annual report could be used as a simple proxy for disclosure policy, with a longer 
report being indicative of a greater willingness to include voluntary as well as statutory 
disclosures.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Table 6 shows that neither of the main reporting regimes (US GAAP or IFRS) appear to 
encourage consistency of disclosure levels.  For example, banks that report according to 
US GAAP are classified as either having “consistently low”, “consistently high” or 
“improving strongly” levels of disclosure. Similarly, banks using reporting practices 
based upon IFRS (or the equivalent) appear in the “consistently high”, “consistently 
average” and “improving strongly” categories. These findings suggest that institutional 
level attitudes to voluntary reporting appear to outweigh the role played by regulations in 
shaping patterns of disclosure (and resultant scores). Consequently, it is not possible to 
generalize and argue that any single set of accounting regulations results in more 
extensive levels of market risk reporting.  This does place some questions over the 
current global convergence processes in accounting standards – particularly when the 
achievement of greater comparability of disclosure is held out as one of the cornerstones 
of both the IASB’s and the FASB’s conceptual frameworks.13  
                                                 
13 For example, in July 2006 the IASB and FASB issued for comment a joint document on the proposed 
content of a new, and common, conceptual framework. The document defines comparability as “the quality 
of information that enables users to identify similarities in and differences between two sets of economic 
phenomena” and declares it to be an important qualitative characteristic of financial reports on the grounds 
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Table 6 also shows that the average length of the annual report of the sample banks is 
increasing over time, from 166 pages in 2000 to 271 pages in 2006. The increased length 
is driven by a mix of both more detailed regulatory reporting requirements, but also the 
increased scope and encouragement of voluntary disclosures.  However, a longer report 
does not necessarily imply more market risk disclosures. To test the relationship between 
disclosure categories and the length of bank annual reports, a two stage calculation was 
undertaken. The first stage compared the length of each bank’s annual report for a given 
year against the average length of reports for that year. A value above one thus implies 
that the bank’s report is longer than the average, and a fractional value implies a shorter 
than average report. For example, Bank One’s report for 2003 scores just 0.4 indicating 
that it is relatively short compared to the average, and perhaps not surprisingly the bank 
falls into the “consistently low” category of disclosure. In the second stage, the ratio of 
the actual report length to the average was calculated for each of the four categories (of 
disclosure level).  The results obtained indicate that longer reports are associated with 
more extensive levels of market risk disclosures.  
 
Banks with a consistently high level of market risk disclosures have a report length that is 
on average 1.38 times the average for all of the banks. Conversely, the banks with a 
consistently low level of disclosures have a report length just below half (0.49) the 
average length. Reflecting this relationship between length and disclosure levels, banks 
with strongly rising disclosure scores have an annual report length that is above-average. 
That said, it is important to ask questions of the capacity of investors to make sense of 
and cope with annual reports the length of, say, Unicredito Italiano – which stood at 552 
pages in 2006. This even exceeds the length of HSBC, whose reporting value (as noted 
earlier in the presentation by Jon Moulton to the Treasury Select Committee) was 
questioned on the grounds of weight by the English postal service! 
 
Overall, therefore, our sample data provides some evidence of institutionally specific 
biases in reporting practice. However, while individual banks may choose to make brief, 
average, or extensive disclosures, the data does not allow us to identify the underlying 
reasons for such choices. Emm (2007) et al. suggest that the nature and extent of an 
institution’s market risk exposures, its need to protect proprietary information, and its 
demand for capital market access are all relevant determinants of disclosure choices, but 
these are not things that can be tested directly on the basis of the information made 
available in published annual reports14. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that it “enhances the usefulness of financial reporting information in making investment, credit, and similar 
resource allocation decisions” (FASB,2006, p.30).  
14 For example, we are unable to analyse robustly the relationship between market risk disclosures and 
market risk exposure because VaR statistics are not comparable across institutions due to variations in 
modelling methods. They also provide an incomplete picture of overall exposure. Additionally, annual 
reports give no firm indication of each bank’s need to access the capital markets nor reveal the extent of the 
risk information that it has chosen to regard as proprietary. 
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International differences in disclosure practice 
If we consider the banks by home country, we find that the banks in our sample fall 
naturally into four different geographical groups.  Figure 1 shows, for each country 
grouping, the range of disclosure scores for each year. Superimposed on these ranges is 
an ‘x’ mark which gives the mean disclosure score for the country grouping and year 
concerned. The figure gives a sense of the disparities in scores and the mean scores for 
each geographical grouping.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
French, Italian and Spanish banks are characterised by generally low levels of disclosure 
and high disparities between different banks’ disclosure practices. Although the mean 
disclosure score for this geographical grouping in 2006 is virtually identical to that of 
2003, the disclosure scores for 2006 span the full range from 0 to 41. This is a 
consequence of the two outliers BNP Paribas (0) and Société Genéralé (41) upon which 
we have already offered comment. It is very interesting to reflect, however, on the idea 
that despite calls for harmonisation of international reporting practice, we can still find 
two banks, falling under the same regulatory regimes both nationally and internationally, 
which are still able to be so divergent in their disclosure practices. The case of BNP 
Paribas also indicates that despite the fact that Pillar 3 of Basel had not taken effect in 
2006, the bank was very far from complying with its spirit of making disclosures that are 
consistent with how senior management and the board of directors assess and manage the 
risks of the bank.  
 
By contrast, North American banks are characterised by a clearly rising trend in the mean 
disclosure score, but a persistent and considerable degree of disparity in disclosure 
practices. This confirms the findings of a 2002 transparency and disclosure survey of US 
companies by Standard and Poor (Patel and Dallas, 2002). This survey focused on annual 
report disclosures and found that companies exercised a high level of discretion in 
relation to disclosures, with the result that there were notable differences in the standards 
across different companies. Variations in transparency can be partially explained by the 
fact that US companies can choose whether to disclose information in the annual report 
or to use their regulatory filings as their main disclosure documents: some opt for one, 
and some opt for the other. This makes life difficult for individual investors and analysts 
seeking to compare risks across different banks, particularly given that the SEC filings 
(though electronically accessible) are not presented in a style that is as “user friendly”.15 
 
For their part, UK banks are characterised by high levels of disclosure, which are slightly 
higher than the average disclosure level for North American banks but with a much lower 
level of disparity. This is confirmed by Table 5 which shows that, with the exception of 
Lloyds TSB, all of the other UK banks in the “Top 25” have disclosure scores in excess 
of 30 in 2006. 
                                                 
15 It is also noticeable that some of the US banks appear to be less willing to disclose the more sensitive 
information relating to market risk exposure and management. Such sensitive information might include 
items such as histograms of trading revenue or profits, and back-testing information and results. This 
finding is also in line with that of Perignon and Smith (2007). 
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Finally, German, Dutch and Swiss banks are similar to the UK banks.  Disclosure levels 
are high, except for the 2006 mean score which dips a little below its 2003 level. One 
possible explanation for this is that, with the exception of Credit Suisse, all of the banks 
in this group were from 2000 preparing accounts that included SEC 20K filings (and 
hence reconciliations to US GAAP). Credit Suisse began doing the same thing in 2003. 
Detailed US qualitative and quantitative reporting requirements on market risk were 
introduced in Financial Reporting Release No. 48 in 1997 and so foreign banks reporting 
in the USA have had time to determine and refine practice in this area.16  
 
Overall, the above data does point strongly to the conclusion that despite the promotion 
of harmonisation post-2000, accounting practice in terms of market risk reporting still 
exhibits significant diversity across geographic boundaries, and in some cases, within 
geographic boundaries.   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The research analysis discussed above leads to four principal conclusions regarding the 
level of market risk disclosures amongst the world’s largest banks. First, we find no 
strong evidence of any relationship between levels of disclosure and company size, and 
we cannot dismiss the hypothesis that these two variables are uncorrelated. Secondly, we 
find only weak evidence of increasing disclosure over our sample period of 2000-2006. 
Third, there is evidence that higher levels of disclosure are linked to longer annual 
reports. And, fourthly, we demonstrate that despite the de jure shift towards 
harmonisation of accounting practice, the de facto result is that international differences 
in disclosure practices remain considerable. This latter point warrants detailed 
consideration. 
 
Evidence from other surveys of financial reporting in banks both confirm the presence of 
variations in risk disclosure practice and suggest that they remain ongoing, even after the 
implementation of IFRS 7 in 2007. PwC’s survey of the 2007 financial reports of 22 
global banks, encompassing both IFRS and US GAAP preparers, found that risk 
information was not positioned in consistent locations in annual reports, nor presented in 
an easily accessible or usable way (PwC, 2008). Another report by KPMG on the 2007 
annual reports of 17 European banks concluded that “despite detailed and extensive 
disclosures, the market risk disclosures are not directly comparable between the banks” 
(KPMG, 2008, p.33).  
 
We would suggest that the ongoing lack of comparability in risk disclosure practice is a 
result of the relative dominance of institutional-specific rather than regulatory influences 
upon disclosure practice. In part, this may be a consequence of the form of international 
                                                 
16 The fact that the disparity between the reporting of German, Dutch and Spanish banks is lower than that 
for US banks does lend a sense of caution to such an explanation and is suggestive of other influential 
factors.   
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regulatory disclosure requirements.  As the Deputy Director of the Bank of Italy 
observed, the abstract and general principles of Basel 2 and IAS are hard to apply to 
concrete cases (Ciocca, 2004). Our research very much suggests that the practical reality 
of accounting disclosures is one where regulations are subordinate to the specifics of 
‘concrete cases’.  
 
The IASB’s declared support for principles rather than rules based accounting standards 
further reinforces the scope for institutional diversity in reporting practice. Schipper 
(2005) recognises that the application of professional judgement implicit in the 
application of principles-based standards does have implications for the comparability of 
IFRS reporting. Principles-based standards mean that disclosures which extend beyond 
the minimal level will be much more dependent on the reporting traditions of, and the 
particular circumstances facing, individual banks when they prepare to issue their latest 
annual report. Furthermore, direct reference to those traditions is encapsulated in the 
IASB’s encouragement of reporting ‘through the eyes of management.’  This stance is in 
direct contrast to the view that investment analysis is based on comparative attributes. For 
instance, the US-based Centre for Financial Market Integrity, in commenting to the IASB 
on its discussion paper on Reducing Complexity in Reporting Financial Instruments, 
directly attributed the poor comparability between firms to the IFRS 7 requirement of 
disclosure ‘through the eyes of management’ and observed that “our experience is that 
voluntary disclosure requirements result in boiler plate, meaningless information” 
(CFMI, 2008, p.9). 
 
The lack of comparability and apparently limited usefulness of risk disclosures needs to 
be seen against a background in which regulators continue to reiterate the importance of a 
mutually understood commercial language and the value, among other things of the 
world-wide adoption of IFRS: 
 
“Ultimately, our capacity to live peaceably with each other depends upon our 
ability to communicate intelligibly and reason coherently. In every case, to 
succeed, we need to first construct a language of mutual understanding. 
Throughout the world, there is no better opportunity to do this than through 
commerce. The fact that today over 100 nations are working on the introduction 
of IFRS and XBRL offers great hope that, in markets at least, most of the world's 
people may soon speak the same language. That is progress we very badly need.”  
 
(International Business — An SEC Perspective", Address to the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants' International Issues Conference, by 
Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman, January 10th, 2008)  
 
However, even people who speak the same language can say and do very different 
things! The strong implication of our results is that we need to be spending much more 
time looking at the detail of what people are doing (and saying about what they are 
doing) in using existing and/or newly adopted (market risk reporting) languages.  This 
may seem a cautious conclusion, particularly given the hopes that have been expressed 
for IFRS 7 in terms of its anticipated capacity to improve the transparency of financial 
risk disclosures and enable the market to assess more accurately the strength of an 
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entity’s risk management processes (for a typical example of such claims see 
http://www.fenews-digital.com/fenews/20061112/?pg=34).  However, there are three 
particularly strong grounds for maintaining a degree of scepticism over the future 
development of risk reporting in the banking sector.  First, as our results have shown, the 
general adoption of IFRS to date has not brought with it a substantial alignment in the 
risk reporting practices of the world’s leading banks.  Indeed, there is an argument that 
the desire under IFRS not to have specific risk reporting standards for banks has meant a 
real opportunity has been missed for a significant strengthening in their market risk 
disclosures. Secondly, the PwC (2008) and KPMG (2008) survey results suggest that it is 
ambitious to expect a new standard such as IFRS 7 to diminish reporting diversity when 
it emphasises the importance of allowing corporate management the discretion to report 
on risk in ways that they deem appropriate.  Thirdly, with potentially competing demands 
for ‘additional’, ‘simpler’, ‘better’ and more ‘verifiable/auditable’ disclosures, there has 
to be doubt as to whether bank risk reporting practices are likely to develop with any 
clear sense of direction – which in turn places considerable questions marks over their 
likely use and value to the readers of bank annual reports?  Indeed, from a research 
perspective, there remains much to know in terms of what has driven and continues to 
drive bank risk reporting practices and who makes use of such information.   
 
Such doubts and uncertainties over the value of risk disclosures, however, have not 
quelled the calls from regulators, politicians and financial commentators around the 
world for greater transparency in bank reporting. The European Central Bank (2006) in 
laying down a range of criteria for assessing accounting standards from a financial 
stability perspective stressed the role that enhanced financial disclosures could play in 
strengthening market discipline and providing early warning signals on risk exposures.  
Likewise, the Institute of International Finance (IIF, 2008) in its interim report of its 
Committee on Market Best Practices has emphasised the critical importance, given 
current banking business models, of high standards of risk management and reporting 
(para. 9) and the need for more “useful disclosure” (para. 17).  The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2008), in summarising the work and recommendations of its 
Accounting Task Force (ATF) and Risk Management and Modelling Group (RMMG), 
has likewise emphasised the regulatory preference for more rigorous disclosure by banks.  
Similarly, leading politicians at the recent G20 summit agreed the need for fundamental 
reform of the way the financial system is supervised, with new regulations to ensure 
greater transparency and accountability.  
 
If the called for transparency – and comparability- of market risk disclosures is to be 
achieved, however, then our research findings suggest that regulatory frameworks need to 
be redrafted. Disclosures based upon the ‘eyes of management’ may not align with, and 
inform the eyes of the market, and to the extent that they do not, then we have opacity not 
transparency. Likewise, it is important to be aware of signs, especially in IFRS 
implementation surveys, of a tick-box/check-list mentality that puts process ahead of the 
assessment of purpose and compliance over consideration of meaning and impact.  If 
references to the importance of ‘principles’ needing to win out over ‘rules’ (and rules-
based systems) are to have substantive meaning, space has to be reserved for the 
questioning of commitments to IFRS and knowing more specifically about what has been 
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achieved in terms of ‘enhanced’ reporting practice.  We would see this as an essential 
element of the ‘enlightened leadership’ called for in this arena by Zeff (2007). 
  
 
 
 24
 
 
References 
 
Abraham, S. and Cox, P. (2007) “Analysing the determinants of narrative risk reporting 
in UK FTSE annual reports”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 227-
248. 
 
APB (2008) Audit Issues when Financial Market Conditions are Difficult and Credit 
Facilities may be Restricted, Bulletin 2008/1, London: Auditing Practices Board.    
 
Ball, R. (2006) “International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS): Pros and cons for 
investors”, Accounting and Business Research, International Accounting Policy 
Forum, pp. 5-27. 
 
Bank of England (2008), Financial Stability Report, October, Issue 24. London: Bank of 
 England. 
 
Bartlett, S.A. and Chandler, R.A. (1997) “The corporate report and the private 
shareholder: Lee and Tweedie twenty years on”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 
29, No.3, pp.245-261. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards. A Revised Framework, Basel: Bank for 
International Settlements. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards. A Revised Framework Comprehensive 
Version, Basel: Bank for International Settlements.  
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008) Fair value measurement and 
modelling: An assessment of challenges and lessons learned from the market 
stress, Basel: Bank for International Settlements.  
 
Beattie, V. and Thompson, S. J. (2007) “Lifting the lid on the use of content analysis to 
investigate intellectual capital disclosures”, Accounting Forum, Vol.31 No. 2, 
pp.129-163. 
 
Beretta, S. and Bozzolan, S. (2004) “A framework for the analysis of firm risk 
communication”, The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 
265−288. 
 
Blanchet, J. (2002) “Global Standards Offer Opportunity”, Financial Executive, 
March/April, pp. 28-30. 
 
 25
Botosan, C. A. (1997) “Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital”, The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 72 No.3, pp.323-349. 
 
Breton, G. and Taffler,R.J. (2001) “Accounting information and analyst stock 
recommendation decisions: A content analysis approach”, Accounting and 
Business Research, Vol.31 No.2, pp.91-101. 
 
Callao, S., Jarne, J. and Laínez, J. (2007) “Adoption of IFRS in Spain: Effect on the 
comparability and relevance of financial reporting”, Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation,” Vol. 16 No. 2, pp 148–178 
 
Camfferman, K. and Zeff, S.A. (2007), Financial Reporting and Global Capital Markets: 
A History of the International Accounting Standards Committee, 1973-2000, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
CAQ (2007) Measurement of Fair Value in Illiquid (or Less Liquid) Markets, 
Washington D.C: Centre for Audit Quality.  Available at: 
http://www.aicpa.org/caq/download/WP_Measurements_of_FV_in_Illiquid_Mark
ets.pdf 
 
Choi, F.D.S. and Levich, R. M. (1996) “Accounting diversity”, Chapter 9 in Steil, B. 
(ed.), The European Equity Markets. London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs.  
 
Ciocca, P. (2004) “Basel 2 and IAS – more competition, less risk”, Speech to the 8th ABI 
Convention - Implementing Basel 2 and IAS: Tendencies, Problems, Solutions, 
Rome, 29 November.  
 
Crockett, A. (2002) “Financial reporting: From shadows to limelight”, Bank for 
International Settlements, Keynote speech, 13th June.  
 
Dobler, M. (2008) “Incentives for risk reporting – a discretionary disclosure and cheap 
talk approach”, The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 43 No. , pp. 184-
206. 
 
Doupnik, T. S., and Salter, S. B. (1993) “An empirical test of a judgemental international 
classification of financial reporting practice”, Journal of International Business 
Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp 41-60. 
 
Emm, E., Gray, G. and Lin, C.M. (2007) “Choices and best practice in corporate risk 
management disclosure”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol.19 No.4, 
pp.82-93.  
 
E & Y (2006) The Impact of IFRS on European Banks: 2005 Reporting, London: Ernst & 
Young. 
 
 26
European Central Bank (2006), Assessment of Accounting Standards from a Financial 
Stability Perspective, Frankfurt: European Central Bank. 
 
FASB (2001) Improving Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing Voluntary 
Disclosures. Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting Standards Board. 
 
FASB (2006) Objective of Financial Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-
Useful Financial Reporting Information, Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting 
Standards Board. 
 
FT (2008) “Société Générale”, Lex Column, Financial Times, January 24. 
 
GPPC (2007) Determining Fair Value of Financial Instruments under IFRS in Current 
Market Conditions, Global Public Policy Committee, 13 December. 
 
Gray, S. J. (1988) “Towards a theory of cultural influence on the development of 
accounting systems internationally”, Abacus, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp1-15. 
 
Gray, S. J., Meek, G. K., and Roberts, C. (1995) “International capital market pressures 
and voluntary annual report disclosures by US and UK multinationals”, Journal of 
International Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 43-68. 
 
IASB (2008) Reducing Complexity in Reporting Financial Instruments, London: 
International Accounting Standards Board. 
 
ICAEW (1998) Financial Reporting of Risk: Proposals for a Statement of Business Risk, 
London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). 
 
ICAEW (1999) No Surprises: The Case for Better Risk Reporting, London: Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). 
  
ICAEW (2002) No Surprises: Working for Better Risk Reporting, London: Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). 
 
ICAEW (2007) EU Implementation of IFRS and the Fair Value Directive – A Report for 
the European Commission, London: Financial Reporting Faculty, Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW).  
 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) (2008) Interim Report of the IIF Committee on 
Market Best Practices, Washington: IIF. 
 
Knutson, P. (1990) Financial Reporting in the 1990s and Beyond, Charlottesville, VA: 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). 
 
 27
KPMG (2008) Focus on Transparency – Trends in the Presentation of Financial 
Statements and Disclosure of Information by European Banks, London: KPMG 
International. 
 
Linsley, P.M. and Shrives, P.J. (2006) “Risk reporting: a study of risk disclosures in the 
annual reports of UK companies”, The British Accounting Review, Vol. 38 No. 1, 
pp. 387–404. 
 
Linsley, P., Shrives, P.J. and Crumpton, M. (2006) “Risk disclosure: An exploratory 
study of UK Canadian banks”, Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 7 Nos. 3/4 pp. 
268-82.  
 
Linsmeier, T. J. and Pearson, N. D. (1997) “Quantitative disclosures of market risk in the 
SEC release”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 107-135. 
 
Marston, C. and Shrives. P. (1991) “The use of disclosure indices in accounting research: 
a review article”, British Accounting Review, Vol.23 No.3, pp.195-210. 
 
Meek, G. K., Roberts, C., and Gray, S. J.(1995) “Factors influencing voluntary annual 
report disclosures by US, UK and continental European multinational 
corporations”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 555-
72 
 
Milne, M. and Adler, R. (1999) “Exploring the reliability of social and environmental 
disclosures content analysis”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 
Vol.12 No. 2, pp.237-256. 
 
Nobes, C. (1998) “Towards a general model of the reasons for international differences in 
financial reporting”, Abacus, Vol. 34 No. 2,162-187 
 
Patel, S. and Dallas, G. (2002) Standard & Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure: 
Overview of Methodology and Study Results—United States, Patel, Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=422800. 
. 
Perignon, C, Deng, Z.Y. and Wang, Z. J. (2008) “Do banks overstate their Value-at –
Risk?”, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 32 No. 5, pp. 783-794. 
 
Perignon, C. and Smith, D. (2007). “The level and quality of value at risk disclosure by 
commercial banks”, Unpublished working paper, HEC School of Management, 
Paris. 
 
Poshakwale, S. and Courtis, J.K. (2005) “Disclosure level and cost of equity capital: 
evidence from the banking industry”, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 
26 No. 7, pp. 431-444. 
 
. 
 28
 
PwC (2006) Accounting for Change: A Survey of Banks’ 2005 IFRS Annual Reports, 
London: PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
 
PwC (2007) Has the Dust Settled Yet? Findings from a PricewaterhouseCoopers/Ipsos 
MORI survey of FTSE350 Senior Finance Executives. London: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.  
 
PwC (2008) Accounting for Change: Transparency in the Midst of Turmoil, London: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
 
Robins, W. A. and Austin, K. R. (1986) “Disclosure quality in government financial 
reports”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 412-421.  
 
Roberts, C., Weetman, P. and Gordon, P. (1998) International Financial Accounting: A 
Comparative Approach. London: FT Pitman Publishing. 
 
Roulstone, D. T. (1999) “Effect of SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 48 on 
Derivative and Market Risk Disclosures”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13 No. 4, 
pp. 343-363. 
 
Schipper, K. (2005) “The introduction of international financial reporting standards in 
Europe: implications for international convergence”, European Accounting 
Review, Vol.14 No. 1, pp. 101-126.   
 
Schleicher, T., Hussainey, K. and Walker, M. (2007) “Loss firms’ annual report 
narratives and share price anticipation of earnings”, The British Accounting 
Review, Vol. 39 No. 2, pp. 153-171. 
 
Schrand, C.M. and Elliott, J.A. (1998) “Risk and financial reporting: A summary of the 
discussion at the 1997 AAA/FASB Conference,” Accounting Horizons, Vol.12 
No. 3, pp. 271-282. 
 
Unerman, G. (2000) “Methodological issues – reflections on quantification in corporate 
social reporting content analysis”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, Vol.13 No. 5, pp.667-680. 
 
Wallace, R. S., Naser, I. K., and Mora, A. (1994) “The relationship between the 
comprehensiveness of corporate annual reports and firm characteristics in Spain.” 
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 25 No. 97, pp. 41-53. 
 
Walton, P. (1992) “Harmonization of accounting in France and Britain: some evidence.” 
Abacus, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp.186-99. 
 
 
 
 29
Woods, M. and Marginson, D. (2004) “Accounting for derivatives: an evaluation of 
reporting practice by UK banks”, European Accounting Review, Vol.13 No. 2, 
pp.373-390. 
 
Young, J. (2006) “Making up users”, Accounting, Organizations and Society. Vol. 31 No. 
6, pp. 579–600. 
 
Zeff, S.A. (2007) “Some obstacles to global financial reporting comparability and 
convergence at a high level of quality”, The British Accounting Review, Vol. 39 
No. 4, pp. 290-302. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30
TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Geographic Composition (by number) of the Top 25 Banks by Market 
Capitalisation, 2000 -2006 
 
Country 2000  2003  2006 
USA 8 9 6 
UK 3 5 5 
Switzerland 2 2 2 
France 1 2 3 
Germany 3 1 1 
Spain 2 2 2 
Netherlands 1 1 0 
Italy 0 1 1 
Australia 0 1 0 
Canada 0 1 1 
Japan 5 0 3 
China 0 0 1 
 
Source: The Banker, July 2000, 2003 and 2006 
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Table 2: The Top 25 Banks by Market Capitalisation, 2003 
 
Position Bank Country Market cap ($m) 
1 Citigroup USA 233,939 
2 HSBC Holdings UK 133,205 
3 Bank of America USA 119,678 
4 Wells Fargo & Co USA 86,770 
5 Royal Bank of Scotland UK 86,472 
6 JP Morgan Chase & Co USA 73,023 
7 UBS Switzerland 72,760 
8 Wachovia Corp USA 58,055 
9 Barclays Bank UK 51,503 
10 HBOS UK 51,041 
11 BNP Paribas France 48,711 
12 US Bancorp USA 47,801 
13 Bank One Corp USA 45,385 
14 SCH Spain 44,946 
15 Deutsche Bank Germany 43,242 
16 Lloyds TSB Group UK 42,838 
17 BBVA Spain 35,731 
18 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland 35,376 
19 Fifth Third Bancorp USA 34,449 
20 National Australia Bank Australia 34,116 
21 ABN Amro Bank Netherlands 32,810 
22 FleetBoston Financial Corp USA 32,397 
23 Unicredito Italiano Italy 30,351 
24 Societe Generale France 29,734 
25 Royal Bank of Canada Canada 29,597 
Source: The Banker and Thomson Datastream 
All figures to June 16, 2003.  *not in 2002’s list of Top 25 
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Table 3: Risk Disclosure Score Sheet for HSBC Bank: 2000, 2003 and 2006 
 
Type of Disclosure 2000 2003 2006 
Market risk definition 1 1 1 
Types of instruments traded 1 1 1 
Risk control structure 1 1 1 
VaR definition 1 1 1 
* Model type 1 1 1 
* Confidence limit 1 1 1 
* Holding period 1 1 1 
* Time frame of data 1 1 1 
* Assumptions re independence of risk types 1 1 1 
Limitations of VaR 1 1 1 
Limitations of alternative risk measurement 
systems 1 1 1 
Stress testing 1 1 1 
Stress results 0 0 0 
Trading VaR – overall position 1 1 1 
* Minimum VaR 1 1 1 
* Maximum VaR 1 1 1 
* Average VaR 1 1 1 
VaR by instrument or risk type 1 1 1 
* Minimum VaR 1 1 1 
* Maximum VaR 1 1 1 
* Average VaR 1 1 1 
Average daily trading revenues/profit – 
overall position 1 1 1 
Standard deviation of trading revenues/profit 1 1 1 
Number  of loss making trading days  1 1 1 
Most frequent daily trading result 1 1 1 
Lowest daily revenue/profit 0 0 1 
Highest daily revenue/profit 1 1 1 
FX trades average daily revenue/profit 1 1 0 
Interest rate trades average daily 
revenue/profit 1 1 0 
Equity trades average daily revenue/profit 1 1 0 
Trading profit – overall position 1 1 0 
* by instrument type 1 1 0 
Histogram of trading revenues/profit 1 1 1 
Tail losses shown clearly and completely 1 1 1 
Balance sheet value of market traded assets 1 1 1 
Balance sheet value or market traded 
liabilities 1 1 
 
1 
* by instrument type 1 1 1 
Net cash inflow from trading 1 1 1 
Back-testing systems: general description 0 0 1 
Back-testing systems: details of models used 0 0 0 
Histogram/plot of VaR levels for trading 
activity 0 0 
 
1 
Total Disclosure Score ( Max. 41) 36 36 34 
 
 33
Table 4: Market Capitalization versus Disclosure Rankings for 2000, 2003 and 2006 
 
Bank            
2003  
Market 
cap 
ranking 
 
2000 
Disclosure 
ranking  
 
 
2003 
Disclosure 
ranking  
 
 
2006 
Disclosure 
ranking  
 
Citigroup 1 14 11 3 
HSBC 2 1 1 8 
Bank of America 3 2 1 4 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
5 7 8 4 
JP Morgan Chase 6 =3 1 2 
UBS 7 =7 4 18 
Wachovia 8 13 16 11 
Barclays 9 9 11 8 
HBOS 10 =17 17 17 
BNP Paribas 11 =14 17 21 
US Bancorp 12 22 23 19 
Bank One Corp 13 =20 20 n/a 
SCH 14 =5 5 20 
Deutsche Bank 15 =3 5 4 
Lloyds TSB 16 19 15 15 
BBVA 17 =17 17 14 
Credit Suisse 
Group 
18 16 8 8 
National Australia 
Bank 
20 =20 20 13 
ABN Amro 21 =5 7 16 
FleetBoston 
Financial Corp. 
22 =11 13 n/a 
Unicredito Italiano 23 23 22 12 
Societe Generale 24 =11 13 1 
Royal Bank of 
Canada 
25 10 8 4 
Spearman’s rank 
correlation  0.196 0.288 -0.120 
t-test statistic  0.691 1.378 -0.482 
P-value of 
hypothesis of zero 
correlation  25.1% 9.13% 31.8% 
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Table 5: Bank Disclosure Scores, 2000-2006 
 
 Disclosure score in: Change in disclosure score 
over: 
Bank 2000 2003 2006 2000/3 2003/6 
Citigroup 21 27 36 6 9 
HSBC 36 36 34 0 -2 
Bank of America 31 36 35 5 -1 
Royal Bank of Scotland 27 28 35 1 7 
JP Morgan Chase 29 36 37 7 1 
UBS 27 34 22 7 -12 
Wachovia 22 24 31 2 7 
Barclays 25 27 34 2 7 
HBOS 19 23 23 4 0 
BNP Paribas 21 23 0 2 -23 
US Bankcorp 8 8 12 0 4 
Bank One Corp 16 22  6  
SCH 28 31 5 3 -26 
Deutsche Bank 29 31 35 2 4 
Lloyds TSB 18 25 26 7 1 
BBVA 19 23 28 4 5 
Credit Suisse Group 20 28 34 8 6 
National Australia Bank 16 22 29 6 7 
ABN Amro 28 30 24 2 -6 
FleetBoston Financial 
Corp. 23 26  3  
Unicredito Italiano 6 13 30 7 17 
Societe Generale 23 26 41 3 15 
Royal Bank of Canada 24 28 35 4 7 
Mean 22.4 26.4 27.9 4.0 1.3 
Std 7.0 6.7 10.7 2.4 10.7 
Min 6 8 0 0 -26 
Max 36 36 41 8 17 
Range 30 28 41 8 43 
n 23 23 21 23 21 
 
 
Table 6: Disclosure Categories and Annual Report Length 
Length of Annual 
Report(pages) Average of 
column E 
across 
category
Average 
length of 
annual report 
for all banks Year
2000   UK GAAP* 2000         251 1.51 166 2000
2003   UK GAAP* 2003         384 1.70 226 2003
2006   IFRS* 2006         458 1.69 271 2006
2000  US GAAP 2000         373 2.25
2003  US GAAP 2003         337 1.49
2006  US GAAP 2006         308 1.14
2000  Dutch GAAP* 2000         132 0.80
2003  Dutch GAAP* 2003         180 0.80
2006  IFRS* 2006         270 1.00
2000  UK GAAP 2000         104 0.63
2003  UK GAAP 2003         124 0.55
2006  IFRS 2006         196 0.72
2000  UK GAAP 2000           79 0.48
2003  UK GAAP 2003          188 0.83
2006  IFRS 2006          133 0.49
2000  Aust. GAAP* 2000          180 1.09
2003  Aust.GAAP* 2003          220 0.97
2006  AIFRS 2006          292 1.08
2000  US GAAP 2000            64 0.39
2003  US GAAP 2003          127 0.56
2006  US GAAP 2006          130 0.48
2000  US GAAP 2000          106 0.64
2003  US GAAP 2003            90 0.40
2006  Merged with  2006         n/a
      JP Morgan Chase
2000  US GAAP 2000          116 0.70
2003  US GAAP 2003          128 0.57
2006  US GAAP 2006          136 0.50
2000  Italian GAAP 2000          339 2.05
2003  Italian GAAP 2003          472 2.09
2006  IFRS 2006          552 2.04
2000 Canadian*  2000          152 0.92
2003 Canadian* 2003          204 0.90
2006 Canadian* 2006          170 0.63
2000  French GAAP 2000            93 0.56
2003  French GAAP 2003          258 1.14
2006  IFRS 2006          332 1.23
Bank Category Applicable Accounting 
Standard(s)
HSBC Consistent high 
performer
Deutsche Bank Consistent high 
performer
ABN Amro Consistent high 
performer
HBOS Consistently 
average
Lloyds TSB Consistently 
average
National 
Australia Bank
Consistently 
average
US BankCorp Consistently bad
Improving 
strongly
BankOne Consistently bad
Wachovia Improving 
strongly
Length of 
Annual Report / 
average length 
for each year
Societe Generale Improving 
strongly
1.38
0.76
0.49
1.11
Unicredito 
Italiano
Improving 
strongly
Royal Bank of 
Canada
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Figure 1: Disclosure Scores by Geographical Grouping 
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Each arrow gives the range of disclosure values for the geographical group of banks and year concerned.  
 
 
 37
